We investigate a toy model of inductive interacting agents aiming to forecast a continuous, exogenous random variable E. Private information on E is spread heterogeneously across agents. Herding turns out to be the preferred forecasting mechanism when heterogeneity is maximal. However in such conditions aggregating information eciently is hard even in the presence of learning, as the herding ratio rises signicantly above the ecient-market expectation of 1 and remarkably close to the empirically observed values. We also study how dierent parameters (interaction range, learning rate, cost of information and score memory) may aect this scenario and improve eciency in the hard phase.
other words, analysts' forecasts are more similar to each other than they are to the variable they are trying to forecast. More recently, a similar data set has been studied to estimate the fraction of herding analysts [2] , with the surprising conclusion that around 75% of the analysts in the data set displayed a marked tendency to herd as a forecasting strategy. Interestingly, about 10% of analysts were instead found to be anti-herding. Stock prices in turn tend to react more strongly to forecasts that dier from the consensus (see e.g. [3] for a recent study).
While psychological factors like social pressure, reputation issues and (for antiherding) a desire for visibility can be crucial in determining this scenario, it is quite dicult to explain these results within the ecient market hypothesis (EMH). In the EMH world, one would expect dierent forecasters to use their respective partial information to produce a proxy for the target variable that is unbiased and such that the forecast dispersion and the forecast error are roughly the same, as would result from forecasters that are independent and fully heterogeneous with respect to information and forecasting ability.
Dierent models in the economic literature have addressed the problem of the origin of herding behavior among nancial forecasters in a Bayesian game theoretic setting (see e.g. [2, 4] ), proving that if an analyst aims at maximizing the value of his reputation with investors (or the chances that investors believe he's a good forecaster) then it may actually be more protable for him to replicate other agents' forecasts rather than putting forward a guess based on his private information. A recent agent-based model proposed by Curty and Marsili [5] focuses instead on the limits that herding imposes on the eciency with which information is aggregated. Specically, it was shown that when the fraction of herders in a population of agents increases, the probability that herding produces the correct forecast (i.e. that individual information bits are correctly aggregated) undergoes a transition to a state in which either all herders forecast rightly, or no herder does.
In this note we study a variation on the theme by Curty and Marsili, aiming at characterizing further the dynamical interplay between learning and heterogeneity of information in a population of agents aiming to predict a continuous exogenous random variable (learning was briey considered in a discrete forecasting setting also in [5] ). At each time step, every agent is required to formulate a forecast either using his private information or by herding with a group of peers and selects the strategy to adopt based on his past performance. We show that the structure of the agents' choices changes signicantly depending on the heterogeneity of information. In particular, herding becomes increasingly preferred by agents as information becomes more and more unevenly spread across the population. However, the herding coecient (measured by the ratio of the forecast error to the forecast dispersion) peaks roughly where informational inhomogeneity is maximal, implying that learning in such con-ditions does not allow for an ecient aggregation of the available information.
The results we discuss are mostly obtained by computer simulations. Deeper analytical progress (beyond the simple considerations made here) could be possible either along the lines of [6] or by reasonably simplifying the coupled herding and learning mechanisms.
Model denitions
Following [5, 7] , we consider a population of agents (labeled i = 1, . . . , N ) who have to forecast at each time step t = 1, 2, . . . , a continuous random variable E drawn independently at each t from a uniform distribution in [0, 1]. The forecast f i (t) of agent i at time t is taken to be correct if |f i (t) − E(t)| < , in which case we shall write f i (t) = E(t). In what follows, the resolution parameter will be xed to the value 0.1 so as to focus the study on the remaining parameters. In order to fomulate his forecast, every agent must choose between using his private information (strategy lebeled p) and herding (label h). In the former case, agents simply propose a forecast f p i which is correct with probability p i ≥ 2 , initially unknown to i. Note that 2 is the probability with which a random uniform guess in [0, 1] is within from E, hence we are assuming that the private information has better-than-random predictive power. Larger values of p i correspond to higher forecasting abilities. We assume, along the lines of [5] , that the p i 's are sampled independently from
Tuning β one passes from a situation in which almost all agents are well informed (small β), to one in which almost all agents have no forecasting ability (large β); as β increases, the information heterogeneity (or the a priori forecasting ability) reaches a maximum when β = 1, corresponding to a uniform distribution. We shall denote by p the average value of p i , given by p = (1 + 2 β)/(β + 1).
When herding, an agent uses instead a prediction f h i (t) obtained by pooling a group P i of K peers chosen randomly and uniformly for each i (our results do not appear to depend signicantly on K as long as K is not extensive; we shall use K = 10 here). This represents, in analogy with e.g. [8] , the contact network of the agent. Our choice for a plain Erdös-Renyi topology parallels that made in [5] , but results are expected to change if dierent topologies are employed. The herding forecast is dened as the xed point of the iterative process
In words, at time step t every agent only interacts with his peers whose initial (private) guess is suciently close, within a range measured by d, to his [7] . The eective interaction range is a crucial parameter to model social interaction and has proved to play a non trivial role in other contexts [9, 10] . Note that the number |G i (t)| of such peers is obviously bounded by K but it uctuates in time; furthermore, in the above sum f j (n) denotes the forecast of agent j who may be herding (in which case f j changes with n) or not (in which case it is xed to f p j ). This denes a dynamical imitation network onto the contact network, close in spirit to that dened in [8] in the context of Minority Games. In this case, however, the averaging operation through which herding is performed does not allow for a straightforward identication of an imitation hierarchy.
As in many other instances of games with learning [11] , we take agents to be inductive: they monitor the performances of their two strategies over time via scoring functions indexed by g ∈ {p, h} that are updated in time according to
and the agent's chosen strategy g i (t) is selected by a logit rule with learning rate Γ ≥ 0:
The dierent parameters appearing above have all been introduced and discussed at length in the context of Minority Games and related models (see e.g. [12] for a broad review). In the present case, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 denotes a memory length parameter, roughly corresponding to the inverse of the time scale over which agents preserve a memory of the past performance of their strategies.
δ p,h denote instead the cost (or the incentive) faced by each player to get his private information or to herd. π p,h i (t) denotes the prot faced by agent i at time step t. For the sake of simplicity, we reward agents who guess correctly with one point, while we take one point from agents who guessed incorrectly.
Finally, Γ is a parameter that encodes for a tunable stochasticity in the agents' choice rules, with deterministic behavior recovered for Γ → ∞. Note that at every time step both the strategy scores of every agent are updated.
Starting from initial conditions U g i (0) = 0, we are interested in observing the steady state behavior of the following quantities:
• The herding probability, measured by the time-averaged fraction of herders:
where χ(A) = 1 if the event A is true, and zero otherwise • The time-and agent-averaged forecast error:
• The time-averaged forecast dispersion:
• The herding ratio φ = Σ/σ
The way in which agents produce their forecasts, and as a consequence the herding ratio will be aected by all of the above parameters but, most importantly, will depend on the information heterogeneity, measured by β. Note that φ ≥ 1. We remind, nally, that, under the EMH, Σ σ, so one would expect φ 1.
Results

3.1
The simplest case
We begin by analyzing the case in which every agent consults all his peer group (d = 1 or G i (t) = P i for all times), has innite score memory (λ = 0) and learning rate (Γ = ∞, corresponding to a deterministic choice rule) and faces no costs (or receives no incentives) to use his strategies (δ h = δ p = 0).
This will be used as a reference situation to evaluate the impact of the above parameters on the game. Fig. 1 shows the average herding success probability q as well as the fraction of herders F h as a function of β. We see that when agents are well informed (β small) herding outperforms the private information strategy and the majority of agents correctly learn to herd to increase their success probability well above p. For large β, on the other hand, when agents have limited predictive ability, they learn to use their private signal as it slightly outperforms the herding forecast. This behavior, including the decay of q that is observed for large β (q → 2 as β → ∞) essentially parallels that observed in [5] . The behavior of F h , by contrast, displays a sharp drop as informational heterogeneity increases beyond the point where, as is clear two strategies become comparable. Such an eect is absent in the one-shot game and is induced by learning. Note that the fraction of herders for β's close the the peak is consistent with the results of [2] . In turn, the herding ratio displays the behavior shown in Fig. 3 . One observes a sharp minimum in 1/φ around β ∼ 1, where it attains a value consistent with that found empirically in [1, 2] , where φ ∼ 5. Away from this crossover region (where, we remind, information heterogeneity is maximal), φ is instead closer to the EMH limit φ ∼ 1. This suggests that inductive agents indeed manage to aggregate information quite eciently when it is distributed uniformly across them, regardless of the quality of the information. This process is no longer possible in presence of a more diversied information landscape.
A naive analytical estimate of the value of β where the game undergoes a crossover can be obtained by arguing as in [5] . Denoting by π the probability of a correct forecast, one has
where q denotes the probability of a correct forecast by herding. Neglecting both the learning and the herding dynamics, q is given by the probability that the majority of the peer group members have a correct forecast, i.e.
A qualitative change is expected to occur when p = q = π. One easily sees from (10) Note that the naïve guess for the fraction of herders given by [5] 
according to which agents with p i < p are assumed to herd asymptotically, does not produce the correct results in the present model, suggesting that the specic forms of F h and of its uctuations, including the large β increase, are likely due to the learning dynamics itself.
3.2
Role of the parameters Γ, λ, δ h , δ p and d
We now focus our analysis on the additional model parameters described in Sec. 2. For the sake of simplicity, we will study one of them at a time as variations of the basic case investigated above. Figures 4 and 5 show specifically how the fraction of herders and the herding ratio change when these parameters are varied for dierent values of β.
Starting with λ ∈ [0, 1], which as said above introduces a nite memory of past scores (for λ = 0 there is no loss of memory while for λ > 0 the score is exponentially discounted in time with a characteristic time given by 1/λ, see [13] for a solvable model that highlights its role in the context of Minoritylike Games), we see both F h and φ are essentially insensitive to λ except in the critical region where informational heterogeneity is maximal. In this case, a larger λ (or a shorter memory) leads to a decrease of both F h and φ, implying that a nite memory may lead closer to the rational aggregation of the available information when the latter is distributed in a highly inhomogeneous way.
Similar conclusions can be reached by analyzing the learning rate Γ that tunes the amount of stochasticity in agents' choice. Its impact appears to be most remarkable close to β = 1, when a (small) degree of randomness in the strategy By contrast, for larger β agents may be unable to identify p as the most likely successful strategy if d is too small.
Coming nally to the incentives δ h , δ p (which are known to have a far from trivial impact on Minority Games, see e.g. [14] ), we focus on the dependence of F h on the parameter δ = δ p − δ h , which is easily understood to be the relevant quantity in this case. As to be expected, incentives to herding, or higher costs for using the private signal, shift agents towards the h strategy, and lead to an increase of φ (and vice versa for incentives to the p strategy). This crossover appears to be smooth only when β is suciently large. For smaller β it sharpens and one observes a steep jump at δ = 0 in both F h and φ, reminiscent of similar eects induced by incentives or Tobin taxes in Minority Games [14, 15] . In this case, agents appear to polarize on the herding strategy as soon as a small incentive is available, leading to disastrous consequences for φ and suggesting the existence of a rst-order transition in δ (though a more rened numerical analysis would be needed to clarify this point). The qualitative outlook is however essentially unchanged with respect to the the case of larger β's.
Conclusions
We have studied here a simple forecasting game with inductive agents who must formulate a forecast by either using their private information or by herding with a group of peers. The quality of the information at an agent's disposal is measured by the a priori predictive ability of his private signal, and we investigate how the game's overall properties are aected by increasing informational heterogeneity in the population. Our main result is that inductive agents may be unable to produce rational forecasts when the heterogeneity is large. In this situation, the herding ratio becomes signicantly larger than one, taking on values similar to those measured empirically in the nancial literature [1, 2] . We have also observed that the ecacy of herding depends strongly on the distribution of information. The role of several parameters of interest in the context of games with inductive agents has nally bee analyzed. Generically speaking, a nite learning rate, a shorter memory or a smaller interaction range may all contribute to reduce the herding ratio when the informational heterogeneity is large.
The interest in forecasting games is based on the fact that they present a simple outlook and a rich phenomenology that allows to shed some light on the process of information aggregation and its limits. It is however dicult to establish a direct contact between these toy models and nancial markets, which still represent the main source of empirical data. One possible step in this direction that is worth exploring would consist in coupling the event to be forecasted, E here, with the agents' choices, as done for example in [16] . E would play in these models the role of a`price'. Depending on the form of the payo one would then observe a dynamical feedback between learning and price' leading to a rich outlook possibly similar to that studied in Minority
Games.
